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Absenteeism and the Overtime 
Decislon 
By RONALD G. EHRENBERG* 
Upon reading the congressional hearing 
on the Overtime Pay Penalty Act of 1964, 
one cannot fail to be impressed by the 
emphasis that management places on 
absenteeism as a primary cause of over- 
time. The argument given is basically 
quite simple: Large firms, it is claimed, 
attempt to account for absenteeism by hir- 
ing standby workers; however because of 
the stochastic nature of the absentee rate, 
it is impossible for them to have replace- 
ments always available. Hence overtime 
must be worked by existing employees in 
order to meet production schedules. One 
concludes from this argument that the 
randomness of absenteeism is the cause of 
overtime. If the absentee rate were known 
with certainty, then management could 
take account of it without recourse to 
additional overtime.1 
In this note we challenge this conclusion 
and argue that a rational economic re- 
sponse to a certainty absentee rate in- 
volves increasing the amount of overtime 
worked per man, while the effect on the 
level of employment is ambiguous. Fur- 
thermore we claim that a stochastic ab- 
sentee rate leads to a larger optimal em- 
ployment stock and, in at least one special 
case, on average, to a smaller amount of 
overtime worked per man than in the 
certainty absentee rate case. Crucial to 
our argument is the observation that many 
of the labor costs which we classify as 
"fixed" must be paid by the employer 
even when an employee is absent, but 
overtime hourly wage payments need not 
be made to absentees. 
Section I presents the structure and 
assumptions of a simple static model, simi- 
lar to that found in Sherwin Rosen's 
paper, when absenteeism is zero. The 
next section generalizes this model to in- 
clude a certainty absentee rate. In Section 
III, we consider the case of a stochastic 
absentee rate and compare the optimal 
solution with the results of the previous 
section. The final section briefly sum- 
marizes the results. 
I 
Given the level of output to be pro- 
vided, the level of technology, and the 
flow of capital services, a neoclassical pro- 
duction function can be inverted to deter- 
mine a unique required flow of labor 
services. The firm decision problem is then 
to choose that combination of men and 
hours per man which will produce that 
flow, and which will minimize its labor 
costs. Symbolically, the problem is to: 
minimize w1M + (r + q) TM 
(1) 
+ w2MH + w3M(H - H) 
* Department of economics, Northwestern Univer- 
sity. Without implicating them for what remains, I am 
grateful to Dale Mortensen and George Delehanty for 
comments on an earlier draft. Finis Welch suggested the 
approach taken in Figure 1, that both generalized the 
results and simplified the presentation of the original 
note, which was based solely on the Cobb-Douglas 
function. Research was supported by a grant from the 
Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Labor under the Manpower Development and Train- 
ing Act of 1962, as amended. 
IThis conclusion and the argument that follows 
neglect the indivisibilities inherent in small firms, union 
rules concerning the existence of stand-by workers, and 
the heterogeneity and scarcity of skilled labor. While all 
these factors tend to limit the employment of standby 
workers they lead us to expect that overtime is posi- 
tively related to the absentee rate. 
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(2) subject to L = F(M, H) 
where (a) F1, F2 > 0 
(b) (2FIF2F12- FIF22- F2F11) 
- (2F1F2/M) > 0 
Here w, represents those employment 
costs per man which are fixed in the sense 
of being independent of the exact number 
of hours that each employee works. These 
include the costs for such items as paid 
vacations, paid holidays, private welfare 
and insurance plans, and many legally 
required insurance payments.2 Some of 
these costs are annual, others monthly, still 
others weekly; the assumption here simply 
being that the employer imputes them to 
himself on a weekly basis. The next term 
represents what Rosen and M. Ishaq 
Nadiri have called the "user cost of labor." 
T represents the once-over turnover and 
investment cost per man of hiring and 
training workers. If these costs are 
financed by borrowing, they must be 
discounted by the interest rate, r, and 
also adjusted for expected replacement 
costs by the quit rate, q. Assuming that 
equilibrium occurs in the overtime region, 
the wage costs per man are the wage rate, 
w2, times the maximum number of hours 
per man payable at straight-time wages, 
H, plus the overtime wage rate, W3, times 
the number of overtime hours per man, 
(H-H)). 
The constraint (2) asserts that the flow 
of labor services, L, is a function of the 
number of men employed, (M), and the 
number of hours per man, (H). For a 
number of reasons discussed by Martin 
Feldstein, it is inappropriate to specify 
the labor input as being equal to the num- 
ber of man-hours worked, (MH). Here we 
assume only that the marginal contribu- 
tion to labor services of each input is 
positive over the relevant region, and that 
the necessary condition (2b) for the opti- 
mizing problem to have a solution is met. 
This condition requires that the marginal 
rate of substitution of men for hours be a 
decreasing function of hours, the usual 
convex isoquant assumption.3 
Upon minimizing (1) subject to (2), 
these assumptions lead to an equilibrium 
combination of men and hours (1*, H*) 
which is a function of all of the parameters 
in the model. In particular, it is important 
for later use to note that an increase in the 
component of cost independent of hours 
(wO=wi+(r+q)T) increases the marginal 
cost of labor through additional employ- 
ment relative to the marginal cost of labor 
through added hours per worker. Con- 
sequently a substitution of overtime hours 
for employment would occur. 
(3) 9H*/9wo > 0, 9M*/Owo < 0 
II 
Suppose we now introduce a certainty 
absentee rate into the model. That is, the 
firm knows that at any given day only the 
fraction "a" of its employees will be in 
attendance. Then its appropriate labor 
input function becomes 
(2') L = F(aM, H). 
The inclusion of an absentee rate also 
modifies the cost function, but in a non- 
symmetric way. In particular, the capi- 
talized turnover costs must be paid re- 
gardless of whether an employee works on 
any given day (or week). Similarly many 
of the fixed employment costs such as 
health insurance, pension coverage, vaca- 
tion pay, and unemployment compensa- 
tion insurance are independent of the 
2 That the magnitude of these costs is not small, can 
be seen by consulting B.L.S. publications such as Bul- 
letin 1428. 
3 Actually condition (2b) is stronger than the re- 
quirement of diminishing marginal rate of substitution 
between factors because a constant budget cost curve 
is not linear when viewed in (M, H) space. See Rosen 
(p. 515) for a graphical illustration of this point. 
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employee's attendance on any particular 
day.4 For simplicity we initially assume 
that they are all independent of atten- 
dance. Finally wage costs, for the most 
part, are paid only to workers actually 
working, hence the appropriate cost func- 
tion becomes 
(1') [wl?+ (r + q)T]M 
+ t 2aMH + w3aM( -7). 
Through a simple transformation of 
variables, it is easy to see directly what the 
effect of the certainty absentee rate is on 
the equilibrium values of men and hours. 
Let A = aM, the number of employees 
actually working on a given day. Then 
rewriting (1') and (2') the firm seeks to 
minimize [(wi -k (r + q)T)/a]A 
+(1)? 411l+ w3A(H - H) 
(2") subject to L = F(A, HI) 
Obviously, in terms of the optimal A, H 
combination, a decrease in a (an increase 
in the absentee rate 1 -a) has the same ef- 
fect as an increase in any of the other 
components of costs that are independent 
of hours, wo. That is, an increase in ab- 
senteeism increases the marginal cost of 
labor through additional workers in at- 
tendance, relative to the marginal cost of 
labor through additional overtime. Con- 
sequently 
,AH* dA* 
(3') (I -) > 0, (1 ) < 0 
An increase in absenteeism causes a sub- 
stitution of additional overtime per man 
for workers in attendance. In general, 
however, we cannot predict the effect on 
the equilibrium employment stock. Since 
A = aM we know that 
101P 1 AA M 
(4) _ (4) d(l-a) a 0(1-a) a 
While an increase in absenteeism (a de- 
crease in the attendance rate) causes a 
substitution effect which tends directly 
to decrease employment (the first term in 
(4)), it also causes a scale effect since more 
employees are now required to attain a 
given level of workers in attendance on 
any day. Because the substitution and 
scale effects work in opposite directions, it 
is impossible to predict what the net effect 
of a certainty absentee rate is on the 
number of employees. 
Note that the above results will con- 
tinue to hold even if some of the fixed 
employment costs, such as daily travel 
expenses, need not be paid to absentees. 
Similarly they will hold if some (or all) 
absentees receive sick leave payments. 
All that we require is that absentees do 
not receive any pay for overtime hours 
that they may have been scheduled to 
work and that some of the employment 
costs which are independent of hours 
worked are also independent of atten- 
dance.5 
III 
Instead of being known with certainty, 
we now assume that the attendance rate 
is a random variable with a probability 
density p(a) that is symmetric6 around 
the mean value, E(a). As in the recent 
works of Kenneth Smith and Michael 
Rothschild, we assume that the firm faces 
a two-stage decision process. The employer 4 This last statement should be qualified. Often no 
holiday pay is received unless the employee works the 
days directly before and after a paid holiday. Similarly 
unless a minimum number of days are worked, the em- 
ployee is ineligible for vacation pay and pension credit. 
Also unemployment compensation insurance costs are 
man-hour (not man) related unless the employee's an- 
nual income is above a certain level. Finally, if the 
employee is "fired for cause," all of these obligations 
cease. 
5 This proposition which can be rigorously proved 
lhas been omitted for brevity. For notational simplicity 
we ignore these generalizations in what follows since 
they in no way effect the results of the next section. 
6 Obviously we also require P(a)>0, 
1 1 
P, P(a)-=1, , aP (a) = E (a). 
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must choose the employment stock, M, 
each period before the actual realized 
value of the attendance rate is known. 
Once the attendance rate is observed, then 
hours per man, H, is determined from the 
labor services requirement (2') in order to 
meet production schedules. The two-stage 
process seems particularly relevant in this 
context, in light of our discussion in the 
opening paragraph. 
It is easy to illustrate graphically, that 
due to the assumption of diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution between 
workers in attendance and hours per 
worker, that random fluctuations of ab- 
senteeism about a given mean level serves 
to increase the optimal stock of employees. 
Referring to Figure 1, the contour L 
= Lo indicates the various combinations 
of workers in attendance and hours per 
worker which yield the required level of 
labor services, Lo. Suppose that when ab- 
senteeism was nonstochastic that the 
equilibriim was given by the combination 
(E(a) M*, H*). Now if the attendance rate 
is stochastic, symmetric fluctuations in 
worker attendance about E(a)Ml* (of size 
8 for example) will require compensating 
fluctuations in hours per worker. How- 
ever, because of the assumed diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution, negative 
deviations in attendance require more than 
proportional increases in hours, while 
positive deviations require less than pro- 
portional increases (in Figure 1, 62> ,e). As 
a result, if the attendance rate is distrib- 
uted symmetric about its mean, average 
hours associated with M* in the stochastic 
case (H*) will exceed the level of the 
certainty case (H*). If we assume that the 
objective of the firm is to minimize the 
expected value of labor costs, then since 
(E(a)M*, H*) represented the point at 
which the extensive (employee) marginal 
labor cost was equated to the intensive 
(hours/worker) marginal labor cost, we 
know that (E(a) M*, H*) cannot be an 
equilibrium point. Effectively the in- 
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tensive marginal cost has increased rela- 
tive to the extensive marginal cost; for a 
given number of men, a larger number of 
hours per man are required on average. 
Consequently, it is optimal to increase the 
number of employees to some level M' 
>M*. 
Associated with this employment level 
(Mi), there is an optimal level of the ex- 
pected value of hours per man (HA). Due 
to the stochastic absentee rate and as- 
sumption of diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution between factors, I1k is greater 
than the level of hours per man that 
would be associated with Mi in the non- 
stochastic case (2). While it is certainly 
true that 2 < H* and Hiu < H*, the relevant 
comparison is between H_u and H*. That 
is, would we observe on average, a greater 
or smaller level of overtime per man in 
the stochastic or nonstochastic case? 
Figure 1 does not give us sufficient infor- 
mation to answer this question and indeed 
we have been unable to compare these 
terms for the general class of labor input 
functions in (2). It appears that the com- 
parison will depend upon properties of the 
labor input function, such as the elasticity 
of substitution between the factors, which 
determine the shape of the isoquant L= Lo. 
If we consider the special case of the 
Cobb-Douglas labor input function, we 
can however uniquely determine the rela- 
tionship between equilibrium overtime 
hours per man in the certainty and sto- 
chastic cases. That is, we assume 
(2"') L = (aM)aLP, a > 37 
In addition to its analytic convenience, 
we may also justify this function's use 
because it has been employed with success 
in recent empirical work by Martin 
Feldstein and Nadiri and Rosen. For this 
particular function, the solution for equi- 
librium hours in the case of a certainty 
absentee rate of E(a) becomes 
* Fwo + (W2 - w3)HE(a)] 
Hc( L w3E(a) 
o-a 
In the stochastic case, the firm knows 
that once it chooses an employment level 
M, hours per man will be uniquely deter- 
mined by the value of the absentee rate 
that actual obtains in the period, i.e. 
(6) H= L=10(aM)-alO 
We assume that the firm will attempt to 
choose M, conditional on the value of H in 
(6), to minimize the expected value of its 
labor costs. Symbolically, substituting (6) 
into (1'), the firm seeks to 
minimize E[woM + (W2 - w3) HaM 
M 
(7) + w3L I(a) ($-a) /] 
The necessary condition for this un- 
constrained minimization problem is that 
E [wO + (W2 - w3)Ha 
(8)a 
+ W a)3L a(Va) IM-] =O 0 
or that 
(9) MA'-= 1[wo+(W2-w3)E(a)TH] (a,B) 
w.3L /0E [a (03-a) /,OI tI 
Substituting (9) into (6) when the 
attendance rate takes its mean value 
E(a) determines the optimal expected 
level of hours per man in the stochastic case 
Hu [+ (W3[a Ea ] [E(a) -a 
The optimal expected level of hours per 
man in the certainty (H*)and stochastic 
(H*) cases may now be directly compared. 
Dividing (5) by (5') yields that 
I The requirement a>0 is the second order neces- 
sary condition corresponding to (2b) in the general case. 
This condition will be crucial to what follows. 
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H 3 (:-a) /a 
(10) H- E[a 
H* [E(a)j]%a)13 
Since a > 3 is a necessary condition for 
our solution in (5) to be a relative mini- 
mum, we can let a== K3, where K> 1, and 
obtain 
H, E(a 1-K 
= [ -(,)]~ or rewriting 
H* LE(a)J - 
* (11) (HU\1I(K-1) [E(alI-K)]1/(1-K) 
< S* ' E(a) 
Using Holder's inequality, it can be 
shown that the right-hand side of (11') is 
always less than unity and hence8 
* * 
(12) Hi, < Hc. 
In this case the expected level of over- 
time per man is less than when the absence 
rate is known with certainty. 
IV 
Summarizinig our results briefly, con- 
trary to popular belief, it is not always the 
stochastic nature of absenteeism which is 
responsible for increased overtime hours 
per man above the zero absentee level. 
This is due to the fact that a certainty 
absentee rate modifies the labor cost func- 
tion in a nonsymmetric way so as to in- 
crease the marginal cost of labor purchased 
through additional workers relative to the 
marginal cost of labor purchased through 
increased hours per man. Although a cer- 
tainty absentee rate causes this substitu- 
tion of hours per worker for workers, the 
net eff ect on the employment stock is 
ambiguous since the scale effect of in- 
creased absenteeism tends to increase em- 
ployment. 
A stochastic absentee rate tends to in- 
crease the optimal employment stock 
above the certainty absentee rate level. 
While the effect on the expected level of 
hours per man has not been determined in 
general, for the special case of the Cobb- 
Douglas labor input function it is shown 
that the optimal level decreases. That is, 
observed overtime hours per man would be 
lower in the stochastic than nonstochastic 
case. 
B See G. H. Hardy, et al., (pp. 134-45) for a state- 
ment and proof of Holder's inequality and relevant 
corollaries. In particular it is shown that for t any real 
numbers, [E(xt)IlIt is a monotonically increasing func- 
tion of t. Note that if we define variability more gen- 
erally in terms of a "mean preserving spread," then 
M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz have shown that for any 
convex function f(a), the expected value E(f(a)) rises 
when the variability increases. Since al-K is convex for 
K> 1, it immediately follows from (11') that an in- 
crease in the variability of absenteeisrm decreases the 
optimal level of overtime per man. 
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